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TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
by
WIENCZYSLAW

J.

WAGNER*

The recent proposal to amend the Constitution known as the
Bricker Amendment concerns a most vital matter for the nation: its
relations with foreign states.
In order to estimate the merits and demerits of the Bricker Amendment it is necessary to get acquainted with the historical development
and the constitutionalinterpretation in the field of internationalarrangements of the United States. The present observations aim at the presentation of this matter down to the Bricker Amendment. The Amendment
itself and the discussion it aroused should be treated in a separate article.
I. THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AMERICAN PRACTICE

A. General Observations
The arrangements between different states, relating to all the multifarious aspects of international intercourse, are known under various
names, such as treaties, conventions, protocols, declarations, acts, modi
vivendi, etc. No classification of those arrangements has proved to be
satisfactory, and although, for example, the term "treaty" purports generally to designate a more important and multilateral international arrangement and the "modus vivendi", a temporary and bilateral agreement of secondary importance, no distinct and clear cut line can be
drawn between them.'
However, it should be mentioned that according to a modern trend
in international law two groups of treaties should be distinguished: the
first embracing the "law making treaties" concluded for the purpose of
laying down general rules of conduct among a considerable number of
states, the second, treaties concluded for any other purpose.! This classi* Instructor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame; LL.M. 1939, Univ. of Warsaw; Dr.
en Droit 1945-47, Univ. of Paris; J. D., LL.M. 1953, Northwestern Univ.
I For some definitions and classifications, see e.g,, VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS (Dublin
ed. 1792), 296; Pradier-Fodere, 2 Droit Int'l 473 (1885); Bonfils-Fauchille, 1 Droit
Int'l 290 (1926); Hackworth, 5 Digest of Int'l L. 1 (1940-44); OPPENHEIM, INT'L
LAW (1947), 791-792; HARVARD RESEARCH IN INT'L L., Art. 1, p. 686.
2 OPPENHEIM, INT'L LAW (1947), 797.

fication has been clearly established by such authors as Professor Scelle,
who distinguishes between "traites-lois" and "traites-contrats", and discusses the former in a chapter significantly entitled "International Legislation".! Professor Hudson has likewise published his collection of the
texts of various multipartite international arrangements under the title
"International Legislation".

B. The Treaty-Making Power
In past centuries, most frequently the head of the state had the
authority to conduct all the foreign relations of his nation. In some
countries, however, the consent of the parliament was proclaimed at an
early date as necessary for the more important international acts. This,
for example, was the case in Poland (Constitution "Nihil Novi", 1505).
Up to the last World War, the unlimited treaty making power of the
head of the state survived only in a few quasi-dictatorial states, such as
Japan or Siam. Theoretically, Great Britain still belongs to this category of states, but in practice, the King will never sign any treaty unless
the consent of Parliament is given.4
In modern states, the head of the state usually has the treaty making
power, but international arrangements of particular importance ordinarily
specified in the constitution require the consent of the legislative body
prior to ratification. In Poland, for example, the provisions of the Constitution of 1935, similar to the relevant provisions of the previous Constitution of 19.21, vested in the President of the Republic the power to
conclude and ratify agreements with other states, but Art. 52 provided
that some types of treaties require the consent of the Legislative Chambers.
Title IV of the French Constitution of 1946, dealing with diplomatic treaties, sets forth in Art. 25 a most modern principle: "Diplomatic
treaties duly ratified and published shall have the force of law even when
contrary to internal French legislation; they shall require for their application no legislative acts other than those necessary to ensure their ratification;" and Art. 27 requires the consent of the legislative bodies to a
few important types of treaties.

C. The American System
In the United States Constitution the treaty power is vested by Art.
II, Sec. 2, Par. 2, in the President, subject to the advice and consent of the
Senate. There are, however, several other provisions dealing with inter8GEORGE

SCELLE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1944).
4 GEORGE SCELLE, op. cit., 477.
5 For discussion of the French Constitution, see L. Preuss, The Relation of Inter-

national Law to Internal Law in the French Constitutional System, 34 A. J. Int'l L.

641 (1950).

national arrangements. Article I, sec. 10, withdraws from the several
states the power to enter into international arrangements. The first
paragraph of Art. III, sec. 2, grants to the Federal Courts the jurisdiction
over cases arising under treaties made by the United States; and the
second paragraph of Art. VI makes the treaties, together with the Constitution and the Federal laws, the supreme law of the land.
Some of the framers of the Constitution promoted the idea that the
treaty making power be vested exclusively in the Senate.' Fortunately,
this procedure, which would be extremely cumbersome and long, would
hinder the development of international relations of the United States
and would be contrary to the practice of other states, was not adopted.
A motion suggesting the participation of the House of Representatives
in the treaty making procedure was defeated in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.'
The provisions of the Constitution vesting the treaty making power
in the President and the Senate were, however, interpreted by the House
of Representatives, in the early days of the union, as leaving it also some
authority in carrying out the stipulations of the treaties by granting the
necessary appropriations. This idea was expressed in the resolution of
April 30, 1796, adopted during the debates on the Jay Treaty with Great
Britain of 1794.8
An interesting discussion ensued in the House of Representatives
concerning the treaty with Russia providing for the cession of Alaska.
The consent of the Senate was given, and the proclamation of President
Johnson declaring that the treaty be observed took place on June 20,
1867, but the House of Representatives split on the question of whether
the appropriation of $7,200,000 for such a worthless territory should be
made. After prolonged discussions, the following resolution was adopted:
"... it being necessary that the consent of Congress shall be given to
the said treaty before the same shall have full force and effect ... the
assent is hereby given to the stipulations of said treaty."'
The Senate refused to accept the viewpoint of the House of Representatives, asserting that the consent of the Congress is not necessary for
the payment of money and the incorporation of territory, when provided
for in a treaty. To settle the question, a mixed conference committee was
established and accepted the following resolution: ". . . whereas said
stipulations cannot be carried into full force and effect except by legislation to which the consent of both houses of Congress is necessary; there6

CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT

7 J. R. Morford,

(1916),

24.

Constitutional Amendment as to the Ratification of Treaties. For

the Proposed Amendment. 30 A. B. A. J. 605 (1944).
82 WHARTON'S INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST
9
WHARTON, ibid., 21.

(1887),
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fore, be it resolved . . . that there be . . . appropriated ... $7,200,000
in coin ...... This resolution was accepted by the House."
After ratification, the treaty is either immediately binding upon the
agencies of the contracting states, or requires a separate act of the legislature, according to the constitutional requirements of the contracting
parties. The first system, consistent with the modern concepts of the
organization of international life, has been adopted by the recent French
Constitution;11 the second is still applied in many countries, particularly
in Great Britain. In the United States there has been established a distinction between the "self-executing" and "non self-executing" treaties.
The answer to the question of whether a treaty, entered into without
abiding by the constitutional procedure of a state is binding or not, is
far from being uniform.
It often has been contended that unconstitutional treaties have no
binding power. Hyde stated in 1922 that an unconstitutional treaty must
be regarded as void,12 but amended his assertion in 1945 to admit of
some exceptions.18 Scelle shares his opinion. 4 Oppenheim writes: "Such
treaties . . . as violate constitutional restrictions, are not real treaties,
and do not bind the state concerned ....15
According to the Harvard Research in International Law,1" a state
is not bound by a treaty made on its behalf by a body not competent
under its law to conclude the treaty; however, a state may be responsible
for an injury resulting to another state from reasonable reliance on the
power of such a body.
The majority of the American and British students of the problem,
however, properly assert that the constitutional requirements of the contracting parties are their internal matter with no bearing upon the validity
of the international arrangement entered into by their agents. McNair
writes that it seems more reasonable to say that if one of the parties, in
concluding a treaty, produces an instrument "complete and regular on
the face of it," although in fact constitutionally defective, the other party
is entitled to assume that the instrument is in order.' Similarly, Fitzmaurice submits that the only rule which is both logical and readily applicable is to the effect that states have no concern with the other's laws
and constitutions.'8
10 Ibid.

11 See Note 5.

2 International Law 9 (1922).
Is2 International Law 1385 (1945).
14 Op. cit., note 3, 475.
15 Edited by Lauterpacht (1947), 791-792.
16 Art. 21, 29 A. J. Int'l L. Supp. 653, 992 (1935).
17 "Constitutional Limitations Upon the Treaty Making Power," in ARNOLD, TREATY
12

MAKING PROCEDURE (1933).
18 Do Treaties Need Ratification?, Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 113, 136 (1934).
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In conformity with this theory, Hackworth stated that in international law the head of the government is entitled to speak for the state,
and if the President of the United States enters into an obligation with
a foreign government, that foreign government is entitled to rely upon
it." If the obligation is violated, it is a violation of an international
obligation.
D. New Trends in the United States Before the Bricker Amendment
The exclusion of the House of Representatives from the treaty making procedure has often been criticized and a trend for a constitutional
amendment eliminating the requirement of two-thirds approval by the
Senate and providing for the House to share in the responsibility for
the conclusion of international arrangements, originated early in the
twentieth century. Prof. Borchard, who stated that such a change of the
relevant provisions of the Constitution has the moral support of the
Supreme Court, asserted that this movement began with Secretary Hay's
denunciation of the Senate for substituting the word "treaty" for the
word "special agreement" in the projected arbitration treaties of 1904,
and that it received further impetus after the defeat of the Versailles
Treaty by the Senate.2" This decision of the Senate, excluding the United
States from participation in the peaceful development of international
life and institutions, for a long time barred the country from joining
the whole system of the League of Nations.2 Prof. Colegrove pointed
out in connection with the Versailles Treaty that "under the two-thirds
rule, a minority of bitter partisans and personal enemies of the President
were able to sabotage the peace system which America had persuaded
Europe and America to accept," 2 in spite of the fact that they were aware
that "eighty per cent of the people" of the U. S. were for it."
The Senate's dealing with treaties has met with sharp criticism on
the part of different scholars and statesmen, irrespective of the case of the
League of Nations. Dean Wigmore, in an article entitled "The Federal
Senate's Neglect of the Nation's International Interests," 4 quoted a special message sent by President Coolidge for the third session of the 71st
Congress, asking for prompt action on ten treaties (besides the pending
Permanent Court Treaty). Two of these treaties had been pending before
the Senate for five and six years, respectively, three for 3 years, three
10 Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee of Commerce, U. S. Senate,
Nov. 29, 1944, S1385, p. 230.
20 Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 38 Am. J. Int'l L. 647 (1944).
21 Shortly before the Second World War, the United States joined some institutions
established under the auspices of the League of Nations.
90.
22 THE AMERICAN SENATE AND WORLD PEACE (1944),
2s Ibid., at p. 75.
24 26 Ill. L. Rev. 794 (1932).

for 2 years, and one for 1 year. Futhermore, nine other international
compacts, not technically treaties, to which the President called the attention of the Senate, were waiting the action of the latter. It must
be admitted that the prolonged procedure before the Senate or lack of
any action on its part was extremely obstructive to the development of
the international relations of the country.
Prof. Borchard, " an ardent promoter of the Senate's constitutional
prerogatives, asserted that up to 1928, only 15 treaties have been rejected
by the Senate2" and about 160 amended. He admitted, however, that 47
treaties were not acted upon at all by the Senate.
The suggestion of a constitutional amendment had some very ardent
partisans, such as the late Sol Bloom, former Chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives," and Senator E.
Kefauver 8
II.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

A. Historical Remarks
In the United tates, two types of international arrangements should
be distinguished: treaties and executive agreements. Weinfeld"9 asserted
that the framers of the Constitution were well acquainted with Vattel's
distinction between major and minor international arrangements." In
the Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 10, which deals separately with "treaties,
alliances or confederations" and "agreements or compacts", easily permits
the inference that the conclusion of executive agreements has been expressly authorized by the Constitution, and executive agreements have
been utilized since the first years of the existence of the United States.
Even the partisans of the important role of the Senate in treaty making,
like Prof. Borchard, admit that executive agreements are absolutely
necessary in the routine of administration. It has been pointed out that
down to the end of the Second World War the United States more often
employed the executive agreement procedure than that of the formal
treaty in its international arrangements."
25

26

Op. cit., note 20, on p. 637.

See W. S. HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE (1933), 7.
"Treaty Making Power: Fourteen Points Showing why the Treaty Making Power
Should be Shared by the House of Representatives," compiled and prepared by Sol
Bloom (booklet edited in 1944).
28 The House of Representatives Should Participate in Treaty Making, 19 Tenn.
L. Rev. 44-51 (1945).
29 Report of the Researches, 3 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 453 (1935), cited by Prof.
Borchard, see note 20.
30 For more detailed historical observations, see also David M. Levitan, Executive
Agreements: a Study of the Executive in the Control of the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 35 Il. L. Rev. 365 (1940).
81 Borchard, op. cit., note 20, on p. 637.
27
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The necessity of executive agreements was emphasized by Hackworth. 2 In enumerating the usual subjects of executive agreements, he
mentioned the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, admission of civil aircraft, customs matters and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal matters, registration of
trademarks and copyrights, etc.
Some executive agreements are entered into according to a congressional authorization, in conformity with a clearly established policy
of Congress (tariff acts); some in pursuance of a specific act of Congress; and others without any previous action of the Legislature. On
occasion, more important executive agreements have been submitted,
after their conclusion, to the Congress, for information and approval
expressed by joint resolutions of both Houses. No uniform procedure,
however, has been followed.
Many international arrangements of vital importance have been
entered into by the means of executive agreements."3 The treaty between
the United States and the Republic of Texas, signed in 1844, and providing for the annexation of the Republic, was rejected by the Senate.
The following year, however, Texas was admitted into the United States
by a joint resolution approving the same arrangement as an executive
agreement. Such action required only a simple majority of both Houses."'
The case of Hawaii was similar.33
Among other more important international arrangements entered
into by executive agreements, are the armistices of 1898, 1918, 1943 and
1945, as well as other arrangements made under the President's power
as Commander in Chief of the United States armed forces.
B. Recent American Developments
The development of all means of communication, the ever closer
international intercourse and the growing scope of matters which interest
the international community, demand a simplification of the treaty making
process and quick action of the Executive. The question was being raised
whether the senatorial procedure of treaty making should not give way
to a method better adapted to the necessities of modern life."
Much has been spoken and written about the international trade
arrangements entered into by the United States by the means of executive
agreements in pursuance of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
V Digest of International Law 397 (1940-1944).
33 Many examples are given by D. M. Levitan, Executive Agreements, 35 Ill. L. Rev.
365 (1940).
34
J. B. Moore, I Digest of International Law 453-456 (1906); S. B. CRANDALL,
TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT (1904), 95-99.
35 1 Moore's Digest 503-520; CRANDALL, op. cit., note 34, p. 97.
36 Some of the articles dealing with this question have been written by Catudal,
10 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 653 (1942); Quincy Wright, 38 Am. J. Int'l L. 643 (1944).
32

1934."' It has been generally recognized that where the policy of Congress
has been clearly established, the Executive may enter into executive
agreements in furtherance of this policy.8"
The case of the St. Lawrence Waterway and Power Project is famous.
Its history is most interesting and involves many questions connected
with the possibility of avoiding the treaty making procedure by entering
into executive agreements."
The Project, embodied in the form of a treaty with Canada, was
submitted to the Senate for its consent in 1932, but was rejected on
March 14, 1934. The efforts of the government to get the approval
of the Project under the form of an executive agreement by a joint resolution was also unsuccessful. At last, after many changes and 22 years
of prolonged discussions, it seems that the project has chances to be
realized.
The method of transferring property of the United States to Panama
by executive agreement (in 1943) also was subject to question." It was
stated, by Senator Connally, that the arrangement did not involve any
permanent obligation of the United States, 4' but the generosity of the
United States Government's action made Prof. Briggs state that the arrangement was at the very borderline between a treaty and an executive
agreement."
The Oil agreement with Great Britain was submitted by the Government to the Congress as an executive agreement, but was returned to
be entered as a treaty. 8 The membership of the United States in international organizations has usually been provided for by executive agreements.4" The participation of the United States in the Universal Postal
Union was decided by an act of Congress of 1872."
The joining of the International Labor Organization was authorized
by joint resolutions in 1934, " and in 1947." 7 It was stressed that the
87 See, for instance, V HACKWORTH's DIGEST 425, and Sayre, The Constitutionality
of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 Col. L. Rev. 751 (1939).
88 The Act authorized the President "to enter into trade agreements with foreign
governments," (48 Stat. 943); during the subsequent Congressional debates, the short
term character of these agreements was stressed; Sen. Rep. No. 111, 75 Congr., 1st sess.,
4 (1937).
89See e.g., E. Borchard, The St. Lawrence Waterway Project, 43 Am. J. Int'l L.
411 (1949).
40 See e.g., L. H. Woolsey, Executive Agreement relating to Panama, 37 Am. J. Int'l
L. 482 (1943).
4 89 Congr. Rec. 3744ss.
42 Treaties, Executive Agreements and the Panama Joint Resolution of 1943, 37 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 686 (1943).
4391 Congr. Rec. 259 (1945).
44See the list established by H. Hart Jones, Amending the Chicago Convention and
its Technical Standards: Can Consent of all Member States be Eliminated?, 16 J. Air L.
185 (1949).
45 17 Stat. 283.
4648 Stat. 1182, T. S. 874.
4762 Star. 1151.

tmembership of the United States would not impose any obligation...
upon the United States to accept the proposals of that body." The
U. N. R. R. A. arrangement" was entered into by executive agreement
and approved by a joint resolution in 1944."'
The absence of any commitment binding upon the United States
was stressed during the debates on the Food and Agricultural Organization joined by the United States by an executive agreement pursuant to
a joint resolution. "° The Bretton Woods Agreements, establishing the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, concluded in 1944, are certainly among the most
important executive agreements ever entered into by the United States.
The Department of State argued that as the United States may withdraw
from the arrangements at any time, they do not need to be concluded by
treaties. 1 An act to provide for the participation of the United States in
these organizations was passed by Congress.52
Similar arguments were advanced in providing for the United States
membership, by executive agreements, in the U. N. E. S. C. O.," the
International Refugees Organization, 4 and the World Health Organization. " The joining of the International Trade Organization, by executive
agreement, was sent to Congress for approval."8
Unlike the foregoing, the acceptance of the United Nations Organization Charter with the Statute of the International Court of Justice
was accomplished by the treaty procedure because of the importance and
the permanent character of the obligations imposed by the Charter. 7
Certainly, the treaty procedure would have had to have been followed even if the "Connally Resolution" had 'not been passed by the
Senate. The resolution concerned the "establishment and maintenance
of international authorities with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world," and intended to assure the prerogatives of
the Senate, providing that "any treaty made to effect the purposes of this
resolution . . . shall be made only by the advice and consent of the
Senate.""8
48 57 Stat. 1164.
49 58 Stat. 122.

50 59 Stat. 529.
51Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 79 Congr. 529,
556 (1945).
52 59 Stat. 512.
58Joint Resolution of July 30, 1946.
84 Joint Resolution of July 1, 1947.
55 Joint Resolution of June 14, 1948.
56 Transmitted to Congress on April 28, 1949, then withdrawn.
87 In connection with this question, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION
AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944).
58Resolution of Nov. 5, 1943, No. 192, 78 Congr., 1st Session; Congr. Rec. 9222
(1943).

The Charter of the United Nations was ratified as a treaty on August
8, 1945. " The United Nations Participation Act,6" which was subsequently enacted by both Houses of Congress, did no more than "give effect
to existing treaty obligations."61 The Inter-American Treaty of Mutual
Assistance of 1947 and the North Atlantic Defense Treaty of 1949,
were entered into by the United States by treaties, thereby following
the Connally Resolutions.
Besides the United Nations Organization, the only international
organization joined by a treaty was the International Civil Aviation
Organization. This treaty, however, the Convention of December 7,
1944, establishing the I. C. A. 0., had much broader aims than to provide
just for the birth of the organization; it layed the grounds for international air law principles.
Some questions were raised in connection with the executive
agreement entered into by the United States and the United Nations
Organization,62 providing for the establishment of the headquarters
of the Organization in New York. It has been generally admitted,
however, that the joint resolution "authorizing the President to bring
into effect" this agreement" purported only to implement articles 104
and 105 of the United Nations Organization Charter, 4 and therefore
no treaty procedure was necessary.
65
C. The Theory of Interchangeability
In recent years a theory has been advanced that treaties and executive agreements are interchangeable and that the Executive is free to
enter into international arrangements by either means. The most farreaching ideas have been expressed by McClure, who asserted that the
Senate's treaty making power should be abandoned, except for unimportant, non-controversial matters, and that "the President can do by
executive agreements, anything that he can do by treaties, provided
Congress by law cooperates, and there is a very wide field of action
in which the cooperation of Congress is not necessary". "(T)here is
nothing that can be done by treaty that cannot be done by Congress59 59 Star.
60 59 Stat.

1031.
619.

Sen. Rep. No. 717, 79 Congr., 1st session, 7 (1945).
See e. g.,J. 0. Murdock, Constitutionality of a Treaty or an Executive Agreement
with the United Nations to Establish the "World Capital" in the United States, 15 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 175 (1947).
6261 Star. 758.
6461 Stat. 756.
605Besides the bibliography mentioned in other notes, the treaties-executive agreements problem is dealt with in the following articles: John S. Dickey, Our Treaty
Procedure Versus our Foreign Policies, 25 For. Affrs. 357 (1947); H. S. Fraser, Constitutional Scope of Treaties and Executive Agreements, 31 A. B. A. J. 286 (1945); 68
N. Y. S. B. A. 175 (1945); Analysis of Treaties and Executive Agreements, prepared for
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Sen. Doc. No. 244, 78 Congr., 2d session (1944).
61
62
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confirmed executive agreement."6
The approach of Hackworth is similar. During the hearings
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, he asserted that except where
the international arrangement dealt with a matter not delegated by
the States to the Congress, the Executive could decide whether they had
to be done by treaties or executive agreements.6 7 These ideas were further
developed by McDougal and Lans.68 Some proponents of this theory
assert that executive agreements should be submitted to the Congress
for its consent only where appropriations are necessary.
It does not seem, however, that this point of view is acceptable. It is
obvious that the use of executive agreements is much more essential in
modern times than formerly. It may be argued that expediency requires
the elimination of the treaty procedure from the American practice.
It is evident, however, that as long as the Constitution is not amended,
this cannot be properly done.
It is perfectly permissible to give a very broad meaning to the
term "executive agreement," and to limit the term "treaty." But the
distinction cannot be abolished, and each of these international agreements must be entered into in accordance with the supreme law of the
United States. The argument that inasmuch as the Congress is entitled
to regulate the interstate and foreign commerce, it may withhold from
the Senate its treaty prerogatives in every case where the international
arrangement deals with commercial matters, also seems to be going
too far.
The theory of interchangeability was severely criticized by the
defenders of the Senate's treaty making power, such as Borchard.69
And even some authors who suggested to amend the Constitution oppose
the resort to executive agreements in every case, as it would amount
to the violation of the Constitution as long as its provisions are not
changed. Thus, Prof. Colegrove correctly writes that "the use of
executive agreements as a substitute for a peace settlement is a palpable
evasion" of the Constitution, which "cannot do otherwise than to breed
a contempt for law that is dangerous for democratic institutions."7
D. Executive Agreements Before the Courts
Until the Colonial Airlines case, 1 no court has ever been asked
directly to pass upon the validity of an executive agreement on the ground
66 INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, 363, 378; reviewed by the author in
42 Col. L. Rev. 887 (1942).
6T Hearings, S. 1384, 78 Congr., 2d Session, 15, 264, 270 (1944).
66Treaties and Congressional Executive or Presidential Agreements; Interchangeable
Instruments of National Policy, 54 Yale L. J. 181-351, 534-615 (1945).
69 Besides other articles, see the reply to McDougal and Lans, 54 Yale L. J. 616 (1945).
70THE AMERICAN SENATE AND WORLD PEACE (1944),

110.
71 Colonial Airlines, Inc. v. Adams, 87 F. Supp. 242 (D. D. C. 1949); see R. R.

Hackford, The Colonial Airlines Challenge to U. S. Canadian Transport Agreement, 19
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that the arrangement should be concluded by the treaty procedure. On
many occasions, however, the courts have stressed that the scope of
the power of the Executive in all matters connected with the foreign
relations of the United States is very board.
The lawfulness of the very resort to executive agreements was
emphasized by the courts in several cases, such as Field v. Clark"2 and
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,7 where Justice Sutherland
stated, as a dictum, that "the power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense . . . exists
as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality."
According to well settled practice, the courts refuse to interfere
with the action of the Executive in the field of international relations.
Thus, in the Curtiss-Wright case, it was said: "In this vast external realm
. . . the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of
the Senate; but he alone negotiates . . . . As Marshall said in his
great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives,
'The President is the sole organ of the nation in its exteral relations,
and its sole representative with foreign nations'. Annals, 6th Cong.,
col. 613 ."
In United States v. Belmont"5 the Court asserted that the "governmental power over external affairs is vested exclusively in the national
government. And in respect of what was done here, the Executive
had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government . . . . An
international compact . . . is not always a treaty which requires the
participation of the Senate . . .
Plainly, the external powers of the
United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws and policies.
The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has been recognized from the
beginning . . . . And . . . the same rule would result in the case of
all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete power over international affairs is in the national government
The Pink case"6 was similar, and it involved the same executive
agreement with Russia, effected by an exchange of notes, which was
interpreted to have as much force as a treaty so as to prevail over the
laws of the State of New York.
J. Air L. 1 (1952); 0. G. Lissitzyn, The Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air
Transportation, 17 J. Air L. 436 (1950), 18 J. Air L. 12 (1951); W. J. Wagner, The
Colonial Airlines Case: Treaties and Executive Agreements Relating to Aviation, Wash.
U. L. Q. 211 (1952).
72 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
73299 U. S. 304, 318, (1936).
741hid., on p. 319.
75 301 U. S. 324, 330-331 (1937).
76 United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
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The recent Colonial Airlines case7 ' which so squarely presented
the question of the extent of the Executive's power to conclude executive
agreements did not add anything new, as the complaint was dismissed
without any discussion of its merits, on the ground that the plaintiff
attempted to sue the United States, a sovereign, without its consent.
III. CONCLUSION

As pointed out earlier, the constitutions of independent nations
usually classify their international commitments, and require for some
specified categories of international arrangements the consent of the
legislature. In the United States, the problem is much more complicated.
Some jurists have attempted to base the classification between
treaties and executive agreements on various considerations, such as
opinions of recognized authorities (e.g., the Founders) and Congressional
debates. Mostly, they apply the empirical approach, and, instead of
making their deductions from the Constitution and the whole system
of American Law as to what international arrangements should be entered
into by treaties and what by executive agreements, they examine the
arrangements already concluded and try to establish what the difference
between the two types of international arrangements is.
This method, appropriate for discovering what practice has been
followed, cannot cope, however, with the problem in its entirety and
should be supplemented by considerations based upon the meaning of
the Constitution. The classification based upon the difference discovered
by the approach a postiori does not prove to be satisfactory.
Thus, not all the differences between treaties and executive agreements which have been pointed out are clearly established or important
enough to entitle us to assume that if an international arrangement has
one or more characteristics of a treaty, it must be considered as requiring
the two-thirds consent of the Senate to be entered into. It is rather the
sum of all the characteristics of the arrangement, which must determine
whether it can be concluded as an executive agreement or not. In borderline cases, the precedents in the field of the subject matter of the international arrangement may be of some help in reaching the decision.
The ancillary argument of expediency, necessity of a speedy expedition
of the matter, and requirements of modern international relations may
be also admitted, although it is vague.
In any case, the importance of the distinction concerns only the
American domestic law, as executive agreements and treaties are equally
binding upon the United States from the international standpoint. Execu7
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tive agreements are binding not only upon the administration which
concluded them, but upon subsequent administrations as well; the history
of the "Rush-Bagot" Agreement of 1817, which remained in force
irrespective of the changes of government, and many other examples
are given by Levitan. 8
The first general observation that may be drawn from the comparison of the treaties and executive agreements which the United States
entered into, is that treaties regulate usually more important matters than
executive agreements.
It may be mentioned also, that while executive agreements are
self-executing, as a rule, treaties may or may not be self-executing.
Usually, executive agreements do not require appropriations and do not
assume any continued obligations of the United States for the future.
Another difference involves the relation of the international arrangement to the general principles of American policy. In general, a treaty
may be contrary to the previously settled foundations of the policy of
Congress, whereas, executive agreements conform with and carry out
the established principles. But of course, many treaties do not depart
from the general policies of the United States, while some executive
agreements do just that. Obviously, the executive agreement concluded
by an exchange of notes with Soviet Russia, recognizing the U. S. S. R.
government, involved a complete change of the American policy toward
that country. However, if the "policy" is formulated in terms of some
legislative enactment, it becomes a law of the land having a much more
stable character, binding upon the Executive.
The distinction based on the number of the contracting parties is
never conclusive. Most multilateral international arrangements were
entered into by the United States by treaties; but there are examples to
the contrary. For instance, the Transit and the Transport Air Agreements
of 1944 were entered into by executive agreements. On the other hand,
many bilateral arrangements were concluded by treaties.
It is sometimes contended that executive agreements do not remain
in force as long as treaties. In many cases this is correct. Often, however, the length of the life of a treaty is strictly determined in the very
instrument, or terminated sooner or later by some action of a contracting
party. There are no everlasting treaties. On the other hand, many
executive agreements have lasted for many years (e. g. the "Rush-Bagot"
Agreement remained in force for about half a century) and the obligations that they impose cannot be unilaterally terminated or denounced
by a contracting party.
It is not correct to say that executive agreements never involve any
7s See note 33.

continuing international commitments on the part of the country. Every
international arrangement establishes a rule or some rules which are
binding upon the parties. In some cases, the commitments may be
extensive; in others, the agreement may impose nearly no obligations.
Obligations always exist, however, in treaties as well as in executive
agreements, although they may be vague and not require any action, as
for instance in some general declarations of friendship not to assume any
inimical attitude toward the other party.
It seems that more definite conclusions may be drawn from the
very provisions of the Constitution and their interpretation.
The relation between treaties and federal laws was not expressly
settled by the Constitution itself. It is now firmly established, however,
that the legislative system of the United States includes four distinct levels:
(1) The Constitution of the United States (2) Federal laws and international treaties (3) State constitutions (4) State laws. Federal laws
and treaties are put by the interpretation of the Constitution on equal
footing, the more recent taking precedence over the former.
What about the place of the executive agreements? Neither the
Constitution nor its construction by judicial decisions can give us any
clear answer.
In a recent treatise, Prof. Crosskey demonstrated that the provisions
of the Constitution may be understood in diametrically different ways,
and that the judicial construction of many clauses is clearly contrary to
their wording and to the meaning they held for the drafters."9 Keeping
in mind that law is a result of experience rather than of logic, it still
seems possible to suggest a logical classification of the international
arrangements of the United States which would well fit into the whole
constitutional system of the country.
Thus, it is submitted that executive agreements concluded without
any participation of the legislature should be placed between the second
and third level. While internationally binding upon the United States,
they have no constitutional authority in the American domestic system
to take precedence over any federal legislative enactment. As an executive measure, they should be in accord with the laws of the country.
When contrary to federal laws, they must yield to the internal legislative
system and are not binding upon the courts.
On the other hand, the President is vested with the power of conducting the foreign relations of the nation, "° being assisted in some cases
by the Senate. He must lead the foreign affairs of the Union in the way
79 W. W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1953).
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which would be the most appropriate for the whole American community.
Therefore, the laws of the several states must yield to international
arrangements of the United States, even when concluded without any
participation of the Senate or of the Congress. The interests of the
nation take precedence over those of its component parts.
Thus, it may be said that treaties may change previously enacted
American laws, while executive agreements, entered into without the
approval of Congress, should comply with them. They may invalidate,
however, state laws. The Executive may conclude such executive agreements whenever they are not contrary to federal laws.
What is the position of the executive agreements entered into with
approval of the simple majority of Congress?
Some legal scholars maintain that executive agreements are the
supreme law of the land just like treaties. This proposition should be
limited, however, to executive agreements approved by a joint resolution
of both Houses.
When the sanction of Congress to an international arrangement is
given, the agreement has the full force of a federal law. Once accepted
by legislature, it abrogates the previously enacted laws of the United
States which may be inconsistent with its provisions. There is no ground
whatever to assert that Congress has more limited powers in approving
executive agreements than in enacting laws.
Treaties hold the first rank in the American system of international
arrangements. Of course, anything that is done by executive arrangements may be done by treaties. But treaties embrace a still broader scope
of matters; the laws of the United States have to be made "in pursuance"
of the Constitution, but treaties are made "under the authority of the
United States." There is no matter which could not be regulated by
an international treaty of the United States. By express provisions of
the Constitution, the states are barred from direct participation in international life. The conclusion of treaties on behalf of the whole nation
has been vested in the President, assisted in some cases by the Senate.
This power is exclusive and complete. The Senate represents the
interests of the several states. If the President finds, and two-thirds
of the Senators present concur, that it lies in the interests of the nation
to enter into any kind of treaty, there cannot be any limitation imposed
upon the exercise of this power. This principle, logical and necessary
for the welfare, development and international prestige of the United
States, is more and more frequently accepted by the courts. Thus, in
Missouri v. Holland8 the court said: "It is obvious that there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well-being that an act
81252 U. S. 416 (1920).

of Congress could not deal with, but that a treaty followed by such an
act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring
nation action, 'a power which must belong to and somewhere to reside
in every civilized government' is not to be found."
From the words "it is not lightly to be assumed" it may be inferred
that in some case the Court would limit the treaty making power of the
Federal Government. However, it did not settle any borderline, which
was attempted in a previous opinion of the Court in Geofrey v. Riggs.8"
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Field said: "That the treaty power of
the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between
our government and the governments of other nations, is clear;" and the
Court tried to establish what subjects were not "proper subjects of negotiation" by saying: "The treaty power, as expressed by the Constitution, is
• . . unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument . . . and those arising from the nature of the government itself
and that of the states. It would not be contended that it extends so far
as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character
of the government or in that of one of the states, or a cession of any
portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent ......
In some recent cases, the Court seems to go even farther in rejecting
any limitation upon the Government. Thus, in United States v. CurtissWright Export Corporation," the court said that "the investment of the
federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not
depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. . . . As member of the family of nations, the rights and powers of the United States
in that field are equal to the rights and powers of the other members
of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely sovereign."
Unfortunately, some jurists negative this doctrine by holding that
there are "reserved powers" of the states which cannot be dealt with by
the nation's treaties. Such interpretation makes a "cripple" of the United
States in the field of international relations, to repeat the words of Prof.
Dickinson.84 Since the several states cannot enter into any kind of international arrangements, and there are to be some matters "reserved" to
the states and thus remaining outside of the scope of the nation's power,
a lacuna is obviously created which apparently cannot be filled. All the
discussions relating to the question of whether the United States may enter
into the genocide convention and into the human rights convention are
unnecessary and prejudicial to the interests and prestige of the nation.
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